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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner-Appellant Gerald Ross Pizzuto ("Pizzuto") appeals from the district 
court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting State Of Idaho's Motion to 
Reconsider and "each and every order, memorandum or decision entered against 
Petitioner in this case by any assigned judge," which stem from the denial of post- 
conviction relief based upon the claims in his sixth post-conviction petition. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings And First Post- 
Conviction Case 
The Idaho Supreme Court has detailed the facts leading to Pizzuto's convictions 
and death sentences for the murders of Berta Herndon and her nephew, Delbert Hemdon: 
On July 25, 1985, while camping in the Ruby Meadows area, Berta 
Louise Hemdon and her nephew, Delbert Dean Hemdon were murdered 
and various items of their property were stolen. Gerald R. Pizzuto and his 
accomplices, James Rice, William Odom and Lene Odom were camping 
together in a cabin in this same area. Based on testimony given at trial it 
was determined that on July 25, 1985, William Odom and Pizzuto were 
planning to rob two fishermen, Stephen Crawford and Jack Roberts, when 
the Hemdons drove by in their pickup truck. However, they abandoned 
that plan and shortly thereafter Pizzuto left Odom and Rice and walked off 
in the same direction that the Hemdon truck had been headed. At that 
time Pizzuto stated that he was going "hunting" and walked toward the 
Hemdon cabin, carrying a .22 caliber rifle. Approximately twenty to 
thirty minutes later Rice and Odom got into their truck and drove up the 
road looking for Pizzuto. Rice testified that as he and Odom were driving 
past the Herndon cabin they saw Pizzuto step from the doorway of the 
cabin holding a holstered pistol. Pizzuto approached the truck and told 
Rice and Odom to "give me half an hour and then come back up." Rice 
and Odom drove back to their cabin, parked the truck, and then walked 
back to the Hemdon cabin. As Rice and Odom approached the cabin they 
heard what Rice described as "bashing hollow sounds" like that of 
"thumping a watermelon." After these sounds had ceased, Pizzuto walked 
out of the cabin carrying the .22 caliber rifle and a hammer and handed 
Odom a "wad of hundred dollar bills." Odom testified that Pizzuto 
indicated the Hemdons had not believed they were being robbed, and that 
Pizzuto made Mr. Herndon drop his pants Ad  crawl to the cabin. 
According to Odom, Pizzuto stated that he "put those people to sleep 
permanently." Odom also testified that "Pizzuto had told the guy and lady 
that he was a highwayman and that he was going to rob them and the guy 
didn't believe him and that Jerry said he stuck the gun up to his face and 
said, '[dloes this look like a cannon from where you are standing at?"' 
Rice testified that he took the rifle from Odom and was about to return to 
their cabin where he heard a "deep snort and some scuffling" sounds from 
the Hemdon cabin. Rice went inside the cabin and saw Berta Hemdon 
lying on the floor of the cabin with blood on the back of her head. Delbert 
Hemdon was lying on the floor, his "feet were shaking on the floor in 
rapid succession" and he had blood on his face and the side of his head. 
Rice shot Delbert Herndon in the head because he "didn't want him to 
suffer." 
The bodies of Berta Hemdon and Del Hemdon were buried in 
shallow graves that Rice, Odom and Pizzuto dug near the scene of the 
murders. After the bodies were buried[,] the money taken from the 
Herndons was divided between the three men. Shortly thereafter the men 
packed their belongings and placed them into Odom's pickup truck. They 
then left Ruby Meadows and headed for McCall, Odom driving his truck 
and Pizzuto and Rice traveling in the Herndon truck. They camped that 
evening at a nearby hot springs and the next moming deposited the 
Hemdon truck in a wooded area, drove into Cascade and rented a motel 
room. Several days later Rice boarded a bus and returned to Orland, 
California. Upon arriving in Orland, Rice notified law enforcement 
officials which ultimately lead to the discovery of the bodies. 
Gcrald R. Pizzuto Jr., James Rice, William Odom, and Lene Odom 
were charged with murder in connection with the victims' deaths. James 
Rice and William and Lene Odom all pled guilty to lesser charges or 
lesser sentence recommendations in return for their cooperation with the 
state. They all testified against Pizzuto at his trial. 
An autopsy was performed on the bodies by Dr. Koenen, a 
pathologist, who testified at trial that Delbert Hemdon's wrists had been 
bound with a shoe lace and a piece of wire. Although Dr. Koenen stated 
that Delbert Hemdon suffered two fatal blows to the head and a gun shot 
between the eyes which would also be fatal, he was unable to determine 
which occurred first. Dr. Koenen testified that the injuries to Delbert 
Herndon were consistent with a hammer blow to the head. In Dr. 
Koenen's examination of Berta Hemdon's body, he noted that her hand 
and wrist were tied behind her back using a shoe lace and a ligature which 
was wrapped several times around her right thumb. Berta Herndon's 
death was caused by two blows to the back of the head by a blunt object, 
consistent with hammer blows. 
The trial court also admitted evidence that subsequent to the 
Hemdon murders Pizzuto approached Roger Bacon, threatened him with a 
weapon, told him he was a "highwayman" and that he intended to steal his 
money and his car. Pizmto then used Bacon's shoelaces to tie his hands 
behind his head, interlocking Bacon's fingers and tieing [sic] his two 
index fingers together. He then gagged Bacon and tied him to a tree. The 
trial court concluded that the circumstances of the Bacon incident closely 
paralleled the circumstances of the Herndon murders because Pizzuto had 
also advised one of the victims that he was a "highwayman" and had tied 
the victims' hands with shoe laces in a manner similar to the way Bacon's 
hands had been tied. 
State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 748-50, 810 P.2d 680 (1991) (Pizzuto 1). 
Pizzuto was convicted of two counts of felony-murder, two counts of 
premeditated murder, robbery and grand theft, and sentenced to death for the Herndons' 
murders. Id. at 748-50. 
On July 3, 1986, Pizzuto filed his first petition for post-conviction relief. 
(#17534, R., pp.l-2.)' An amended petition was filed (#17534, Tr., 2-10-87, pp.4-5),2 
and an answer was filed (#I7534, R., pp.43-46). Pizzuto also filed a motion to disqualify 
the district judge, the Honorable George Reinhardt, apparently contending he was biased 
because he presided over Pizzuto's trial and sentencing3 (#17534, Tr., 2-10-87, pp.18- 
21.) The motion was denied with Judge Reinhardt stating, "This Court is neither biased 
' The parties stipulated to have the district court take judicial notice of the clerk's records 
and transcripts associated with Pizmto's underlying convictions, death sentences and 
prior post-conviction cases. (#34845, R., pp.352-58.) Therefore because of the multiple 
records and transcripts associated with Pizzuto's other appeals which are involved in this 
appeal, the state will refer to the records and transcripts by their respective supreme court 
numbers, including: (1) #16489, underlying criminal appeal and sentencing; (2) #17534, 
first post-conviction case; (3) #21637, second post-conviction case; (4) #24802, third 
post-conviction case; (5) ##22075/33907, fourth post-conviction case; (6) #32679, fifth 
post-conviction case; and (7) #34845, sixth and instant post-conviction case. 
Because the amended petition is not part of the Clerk's Record, the claims raised in the 
petition are unknown. 
Neither the motion nor supporting affidavit are part of the Clerk's Record. 
nor prejudiced nor [sic] against either party to the action." (#17534, Tr., 4-7-88, p.1.) 
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Reinhardt entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, denying Pizzuto post-conviction relief. (#17534, R., pp.153-159.) 
- 
Pizzuto also filed a Motion for New Trial, seeking reconsideration of Judge 
Reinhardt's decision in the post-conviction case (#17434, Supp. R., pp.3-7), during which 
he filed another Motion for Disqualification, contending Judge Reinhardt "may have 
become a witness in this matter concerning what information he received prior to 
sentencing which was not disclosed to the defense" (#17534, Second Supp. R., pp.76-77). 
Pizzuto later withdrew his Motion for Disqualification. (#17534, Tr. 6-29-88, pp.1-3.) 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated Pizzuto's robbery conviction, 
concluding it merged as a lesser-included offense of felony-murder. Pizzuto I, 119 Idaho 
at 756-58. Pizzuto's remaining convictions, sentences and denial of post-conviction 
relief were affirmed in June 1991. Td. at 778. Addressing the denial of Pizmto's motion 
to disqualify Judge Reinhardt, the court concluded: 
[W]e find no basis to believe that the purpose of the trial court's 
examination of witnesses was in an attempt to elicit testimony favorable to 
the State's position. However, even if this motivation alleged by Pizzuto 
were true, Pizzuto failed to specify the exact incidents of this alleged 
misconduct. Pizzuto therefore asks us to speculate as to the motivation 
behind Judge Reinhardt's questions to determine if he was prejudiced 
against Pizzuto. We find this assertion to be without merit and we find no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Id. at 777 (internal citation omitted). 
-
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Pizmto's Second &st-conviction Case 
Pizzuto filed his first federal habeas petition in 1992. Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 
949, 954 (9'h Cir. 2002). While his habeas petition was pending, on April 18, 1994, 
Pizzuto returned to state court and filed his second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
(#21637, R., pp.1-29.) Among other claims, Pizzuto expressly contended he was denied 
due process based, in part, upon "off-the record comments to members of Mr. Pizzuto's 
family, including Mr. Pizzuto's mother, Pamela R. Pizzuto, his father, Gerald R. Pizzuto, 
Sr., and his sister, Toni J. King, which demonstrate that Judge Reinhardt had a bias 
against Petitioner which prevented him from giving Petitioner a fair trial." (#21637, R., 
pp.15-16.) Pizzuto moved to disqualify Judge ~e inhard t .~  Relying upon I.C. 4 19-2719, 
the state filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the court was without jurisdiction to consider 
the claims in the petition because it was successive and contained claims that were known 
or reasonably should have been known at the time Pizzuto brought his first petition. 
(#21637, R., pp.30-31.) The court granted the state's motion. (#21637, R., pp.46-47.) 
Based upon the jurisdictional aspects of I.C. 4 19-2719, the court denied Pizzuto's motion 
to disqualify because it was moot. (#21637, R., p.47.) 
Based upon I.C. $ 19-2719, the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed Pizzuto's appeal 
in August 1995, because he failed to establish the claims were not known and reasonably 
could not have been known when he filed his first petition, including his claim of judicial 
bias. Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471-72, 903 P.2d 58 (1995) (Pizzuto 11). 
Addressing Pizzuto's motion to disqualify Judge Reinhardt, the supreme court declined to 
address the issue because the state had filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based upon 
I.C. $ 19-2719, which is "jurisdictional in nature, . . . specifically depriving the courts of 
Idaho of the power to consider any claims for relief that have been waived under the 
The Clerk's Record does not contain Pizzuto's motion. In his Petition for Post- 
Conviction Relief Pizzuto "seek[sJ the recusal of Judge George Reinhardt for all 
proceedings henceforth." (#21637, R., p.4.) 
statute." Id. at 471. Therefore, because the court was "not reviewing or deferring to any 
determination made by the court below," it proceeded directly to address the state's 
motion to dismiss the appeal. Id. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Pizzuto's Third Post-Conviction Case 
Upon returning to federal court, the district court denied federal habeas relief in 
April 1997. Pizzuto, 280 F.3d at 954. While Pizzuto's appeal before the Ninth Circuit 
was pending, he returned to state court and filed another successive post-conviction 
petition, alleging the state withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963), involving his co-defendants William Odom and James Rice. (#24802, R., 
p p  1-11 ) The district court permitted the petition to be amended with prosecutorial 
misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, both based upon alleged 
perjured testimony. (#24802, R., pp.152-68, 195-96.) Pizzuto also filed another motion 
to disqualify Judge Reinhardt, "due to his failure to disclose certain exculpatory or other 
discoverable information to trial counsel concerning the Defendant and/or co- 
defendantstJames Rice and William Odom." After hearing from Pizzuto's sister, Tony 
Lacasellaa, aka Toni J. King, and reviewing various affidavits, the district court denied 
Pizzuto's Motion to Disqualify for Cause, concluding "The Court's neither prejudice [sic] 
for or against any party or case in this matter." (#24802, Tr., pp.4-16.) The court also 
entered a written decision. (#24802, R., pp.193-95.) Pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2719, the state 
again moved to dismiss Pizzuto's successive petition (#24802, R., pp.45-46), which the 
district court granted because Pizzuto failed to establish he could not have raised the 
claims in his earlier petitions for post-conviction relief (#24802, R., pp. 193-207). 
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in September 2000, because: (1) Pizzuto knew 
of the information or could have discovered it at an earlier date; (2) more than ten years 
had passed since the information could reasonably have been known; and (3) the 
allegedly withheld information "would have been used only to impeach the testimony of 
Rice and Odom," which cannot constitute a basis for filing a successive post-conviction 
petition under 1.C. 8 19-2719. Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 797-99, 10 P.3d 742 
(2000) (Pizzuto 111). Addressing the motion to disqualify, the supreme court explained, 
"Pizzuto has unsuccessfully challenged Judge Reinhardt's refusal to disqualify himself 
from this case since Pizzuto's first appeal," and "Pizzuto has failed to show that Judge 
Reinhardt abused his discretion in refusing to disqualify himself." & at 799. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Pizzuto's Fourth Post-Conviction Case 
On February 6, 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas 
relief. See Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949 (9'h Cir.  ZOO^).^ The Supreme Court denied 
Pizzuto's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Pizzuto v. Fisher, 546 U.S. 976 (2005). 
On July 30, 2002, while the mandate was stayed in the Ninth Circuit, Pizzuto v. 
a, 280 F.3d 1217 (9" Cir. 2002), Pizzuto filed his fourth Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief and a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentences, contending his death sentence violated 
the dictates of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), in which the Supreme Court 
concluded juries must find statutory aggravating factors. (##22075/33907, R., pp.1-10.) 
On December 16, 2005, the district court dismissed Pizzuto's successive petition and 
Rule 35 motion because &@ is not retroactive to cases on collateral review. 
5 .  P~zzuto'smotion to enlarge the record on appeal, motion to remand to supplement his 
federal habeas petition and his first Application for Permission to File Second Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District Court were denied. Pizzuto, 280 F.3d at 954 n.1. 
(##22075133907, R., pp.88-90.) Pizzuto did not request the disqualification of Judge 
Reinhardt when he presided over Pizzuto's fourth post-conviction case. 
Pursuant to LC. 5 19-2719, the state filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, which the 
Idaho Supreme Court granted in an unpublished Order on December 28, 2006. 
(Appendix A (Pizzuto IV).) However, certiorari was granted by the United States 
Supreme Court, and the Idaho Supreme Court's order "vacated, and the cause is 
remanded to the Supreme Court of Idaho for flirther consideration in light of Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 552 U.S. - (2008)." Pizzuto v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008). 
Pizzuto's appeal on remand remains pending before the ldaho Supreme Court. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Pizzuto's Fifth Post-Conviction Case 
On June 19, 2003, Pizzuto filed his fifth post-conviction petition contending his 
death sentences violate Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in which the Supreme 
Court concluded mentally retarded murderers cannot be executed. (1132679, R., pp.1-10.) 
Again, Pizzuto filed a motion to disqualify Judge Reinhardt (#32679, R., pp.122-24), 
which was denied (#32679, R., pp.193-94). Judge Reinhardt also concluded Pizzuto's 
petition was not timely filed under I.C. § 19-2719, because it was not filed within forty- 
two days after the Supreme Court issued m. (#32679, R., pp.309-10.) Alternatively, 
the petition was not timely filed "within a 'reasonable time' following Atkdns," because 
"the allegations supporting the Ring [sic] Petition were based upon facts known at the 
time of Pizzuto's sentencing." (#32679, R., p.310.) The court concluded even if the 
petition was timely filed, "Pizzuto failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
supporting his claim of mental retardation." (#32679, R., p.3 10.) 
Addressing Pizntto's motion to disqualify, the Idaho Supreme Court detailed 
Pizzuto's history of attempting to disqualify Judge Reinhardt, particularly the attempts 
based upon the affidavits of Pizzuto's family members, and concluded, "Pizmto has 
known of the statements attributed to Judge Reinhardt since his trial. He has had ample 
opportunity to assert they are evidence of bias in his first and third post-conviction 
petition proceedings, and he chose not to do so. Ile has therefore waived any claim of 
bias based upon those alleged statements. Judge Reinhardt did not e n  in refusing to grant 
the motion for disqualification." Pizzuto v. State, --- Idaho ---, 2008 WL 466568, *4-6 
(2008) (Pizzuto V). Addressing Pizmto's mental retardation claim, the supreme court 
affirmed, concluding he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at +7-12.~ 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Pizzuto's Sixth (Instant) Post-Conviction Case 
On November 25, 2005, Pizzuto filed his instant successive post-conviction 
petition contending the state withheld exculpatory evidence based upon an alleged 
"undisclosed deal with James Rice that he would receive a 20 year sentence and serve 
even less actual time," "prosecutorial misconduct" based upon the concealment of the 
alleged plea agreement with Rice and allegedly knowingly introducing false evidence 
regarding blood found in the cabin where the murders occurred and on Pizzuto's clothing, 
judicial misconduct, and actual innocence. (#34845, R., pp.22-24.) 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l), the state filed a Motion to Disqualify, without 
cause, the Honorable John Bradbury (1134845, R., pp.306-07), which was granted 
(#34845, R., p.309). Based upon a request for "assignment of a district judge outside 
Pizzuto was permitted to file a successive federal habeas petition based upon m, 
which is pending before the district court. See Pizzuto v. Hardison, CV-05-516-S-BLW. 
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Idaho County, Second Judicial District," the Idaho Supreme Court ordered Pizzuto's case 
be reassigned "within the Fourth Judicial District." (#34845, R., p.329.) The Honorable 
Darla Williamson was assigned to Pizzuto's case. (#34845, R., p.331.) 
The state filed an answer (#34845, R, pp.341-48), and a Motion for Summary 
Dismissal primarily asserting Pizzuto failed to establish the claims in his successive 
petition were not known or reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first 
post-conviction petition (834845, R., pp.366-68). On May 8, 2006, Pizzuto moved to 
amend his petition seeking to add two additional claims, denial of an impartial judge and 
cumulative error. (#34845, R., pp.369-73.) Although the state objected, asserting the 
claims were futile under I.C. 8 19-2719 because they were untimely (#34845, R., pp.413- 
19), the district court granted Pizzuto's motion (#34845, R., pp.499-501). 
In a decision that barely considers whether the claims were known or reasonably 
could have been known when Pizzuto filed his first post-convictior~ petition, the district 
court denied post-conviction relief on all claims, except a claim of judicial misconduct 
involving "the fundamental fairness of [Pizzuto's] sentencing," which the court cobbled 
together from a supporting affidavit. (834845, R., pp.501-15.)7 The district court also 
struck the state's supplemental brief because an evidentiary hearing hear already been 
scheduled and "[tlhere [was] insufficient time before the evidentiary hearing scheduled 
on June 26, 2006, to allow more briefing on the motion for summary dismissal." 
' The district court opined that Pizzuto's "cumulative error" claim survived, only because 
it is "directly related to and derivative of the claim of judicial misconduct involving the 
dinner conversation in the presence of Angellina Rawson." (5134845, R., p.5 15 n.1 I.) 
(#34845, R., p.519.)8 Pizzuto's June 12, 2006 Motion to Reconsider (#34845, R., 
pp.547-50), was denied by the district court on June 15,2006 (k134845, R., pp.561-66). 
At the conclusion of a hearing on June 22,2005, Judge Williamson stated, "I need 
to talk to the parties off the record as to the issue of Judge Reinhardt." (#34845, Tr., 6- 
22-06, p.51.) That same day, Judge Williamson recused herself from Pizzuto's case. 
(#34845, R., p.600),9 and the Honorable Deborah Bail was assigned to preside over 
Pizzuto's case (#34845, R., p.601). 
On July 20, 2006, the state filed a Motion to Reconsider, asking Judge Bail to 
reconsider Judge Williamson's denial of the remaining claims. (#34845, R., pp.611-13.) 
On August 16, 2007, Pizmto's case was reassigned to the Honorable Patrick H. Owen 
(#34845, R., p.625) because the Idaho Legislature authorized an additional district judge 
in the Fourth Judicial District and Pizzuto's case was one of Judge Owen's reassigned 
cases (#34845, R., p.641 n.3). After hearing oral argument (#34845, Tr., 9-26-07), on 
October 31, 2007, Judge Owen granted the state's Motion to Reconsider, concluding 
Pimto 's  claim regarding judicial bias at sentencing was known or reasonably could have 
been known when the first post-conviction petition was filed, and dismissing the 
remaining claims in the successive petition. (#34845, R., pp.637-48.) Pizzuto's timely 
Notice of Appeal was filed December 12,2007. (#34845, R., pp.651-54.) 
Oral argument on the state's Motion for Summary Dismissal was held May 25, 2006, 
which was the parties' first hint the district court was cobbling together a claim of 
judicial misconduct at sentencing based upon a supporting affidavit. (#34845, Tr., 5-25- 
06, pp.35-43.) The state's supplemental brief was filed the following day on May 26, 
2006. (#34845, R., p.672, referencing exhibit 15.) 
While Judge Williamson did not disclose on the record the reason for her recusal, in a 
subsequent pleading the state averred she advised the parties she had been a plaintiff in a 
lawsuit presided over by Judge Reinhardt, see In re Williamson, 135 Idaho 452, 19 P.3d 
766 (2001), and recused herself to avoid the appearance of impropriety. (#34845, R., 
p.672A, referencing exhibit 29, pp.4-5.) 
ISSUES 
Contrary to I.A.R. 35(a)(4), Pizzuto has failed to state any issues on appeal. The 
state wishes to phrase the issue on appeal as follows: 
1. Because Pizzuto's case is governed by I.C. 5 19-2719 and he has failed to make a 
prima facie showing that the claims in his successive petition were not known or 
reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first post-conviction 
petition in 1986, or the claims were not filed within a reasonable time after they 
were known or reasonably could have been known, or the claims are based upon 
nothing more than impeaching evidence, is this Court without jurisdiction to hear 
the claims, requiring dismissal of this appeal? 
Alternatively, should this Court conclude Pizzuto has passed the gateway 
established by I.C. 5 19-2719, the state phrases the issues as follows: 
2. Because Pizzuto failed to comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(4) by providing a list of issues 
on appeal, is this Court precluded from addressing the merits of his appeal? 
3. Has Pizzuto failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his "judicial 
misconduct" claims which were actually pled in his amended successive petition? 
4. Has Pizzuto failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his 
"prosecutorial misconduct" claim? 
5 .  Has Pizzuto failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his "actual 
innocence" claim? 
6 .  Has Pizzuto failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his 
"cumulative error" claim? 
7. Has Pizzuto failed to establish Judge Owen abused his discretion by reconsidering 
Judge Williamson's decision regarding the "dinner" claim of judicial misconduct 
because the state was not required to present additional evidence or argument? 
8. Has Pizzuto failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying 
Pizzuto's request to depose five additional individuals when Pizzuto failed to 
establish they were necessary to protect his substantial rights and the district court 
authorized the depositions of two individuals? 
9. Has Pizzuto failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his request to submit seven documents that were irrelevant to the issue of whether 
he could overcome the procedural bars of I.C. § 19-2719 and were inadmissible 
under Idaho's rules of evidence? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Pizzuto Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Overcoming The Procedural Bars Of I.C. 5 
19-2719, Which Governs Successive Post-Conviction Petitions In Capital Cases 
A. Introduction 
In his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Pizzuto raised the following 
claims: (1) the withholding of exculpatory evidence based upon "crucial impeachment 
evidence" involving an alleged "secret deal" with Rice in which Rice would receive a 
twenty-year sentence, and knowingly eliciting "false testimony" regarding the alleged 
deal with Rice; (2) prosecutorial misconduct based upon: (a) the prosecutor's "deliberate 
conceal~nent of the plea bargain" allegedly provided to Rice; (b) "knowingly introducing 
false evidence regarding blood found in the cabin where the murders supposedly 
occurred, and false evidence regarding blood found on what it asserted were petitioner's 
clothes"; (3) judicial misconduct based up011 (a) Judge Reinhardt allegedly participating 
in off-the-record plea negotiations with Rice's attorney and the prosecutor which were 
not disclosed to Pizzuto's counsel and "created a false public record about the plea"; (b) 
creating a record for Rice which "used deliberately false testimony to convict" Pizzuto; 
[c) permitting the prosecutor to use false testimony to convict Pizzuto; (d) "engag[ing] in 
ex parte contact with the jurors during deliberations and more particularly following their 
verdict but before the sentencing proceedings"; and (e) the district court also cobbled 
together a claim of judicial bias based upon a supporting affidavit stemming from Judge 
Reinhardt's alleged statements during dinner with Rice's attorney, the prosecutor, former 
Sheriff Randy Raldwin, and Pizzuto's sister, Angellina Rawson, aka Pizzuto; (4) denial 
of due process and an impartial judge stemming from Judge Reinhardt's "continued 
assignment of this case and its related postconviction proceedings"; (5) cumulative error; 
and (6) actual innocence. (#34845, R., pp.400-03.) 
Pizzuto opens his brief discussing the merits of his claims, the denial of an 
evidentiary hearing, and various discovery issues. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-45.) 
However, before these issues can be addressed, Pizzuto must first demonstrate he has 
complied with the dictates of I.C. 5 19-271 9 because this appeal involves the denial of 
relief from a successive post-conviction petition in a capital case. Because he has failed 
to meet his burden under I.C. 5 19-2719, Pizzuto's appeal must be dismissed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently articulated the standard of review in appeals 
stemming from the denial of post-conviction relief in capital successive petitions. "When 
this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of 
Idaho Code 5 19-2719, the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to 
directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 19- 
2719 have been met, and rule accordingly." Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51,55, 156 P.3d 
552 (2007) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002)), remanded 
on other grounds by Hairston v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008). 
C. Pizzuto's Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Governed By I.C. 6 19-2719 
Idaho Code § 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures 
in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction 
proceedings which are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
("UPCPA"), are civil in nature and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Idaho Code $ 19-2719 does 
not eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA in capital cases, but acts as a modifier and 
"supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict." McKinnev v. State, 
133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144 (1999); m, 127 Idaho at 470. 
Specifically, I.C. $ 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise 
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which 
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rboades, 120 Idaho 
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in I.C. 4 19-2719(5), 
which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated 
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within 
the time frame allowed by the statute." Id., 120 Idaho at 807. A capital defendant who 
brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has a "heightened burden and must 
make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that petition fit within the narrow 
exception provided by the statute." m, 127 Idaho at 471. 
Additionally, claims which were not known or which could not have reasonably 
been known within forty-two days of judgment "must be asserted within a reasonable 
time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." Paz v. State, 123 
Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. In ascertaining 
what constitutes a "reasonable time," the Idaho Supreme Court has recently explained: 
[A] reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have 
known of the claim, unless petitioner shows that there were extraordinary 
circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that 
time period. In that event, it still must be filed within a reasonable time 
after the clainl was known or knowable. 
Pizzuto V, 2008 WL 466568, "6. 
A successive post-conviction petition is "facially insufficient" if it merely alleges 
"matters that are cumulative or impeaching or would not, even if the allegations were 
true, cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction or sentence." I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(b). If 
evidence is merely cun~ulative with evidence already within the possession of the defense 
at the time the first petition for post-conviction relief is filed, a procedural bar exists 
mandating dismissal of the successive petition. Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647-49, 8 
Even if the petitioner can meet these mandates, I.C. 9 19-2719(5j(a) details the 
additional requirements that must be met before the successive petition may be heard: 
An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be 
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a 
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material 
facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand 
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that 
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or 
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed. 
I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(a). 
If a capital petitioner fails to comply with the requirements of I.C. fj 19-271 9, the 
issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[tlhe courts of Idaho shall have no 
power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such 
relief." I.C. 5 19-2719(5); McKimev, 133 Idaho at 700. Likewise, failure to meet the 
requirements of I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(a) mandates dismissal of the successive post- 
conviction petition. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286,289-90, 17 P.3d 230 (2000). 
In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the Idaho Supreme 
Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of I.C. § 19-2719: 
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to 
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of 
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences." 
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by 
requiring that all collateral claims for relief . . . be consolidated in one 
proceeding. . . ." We hold that the legislature's determination that it was 
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational 
basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set for I.C. 5 19-2719. 
The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with 
a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences. 
The United States Supreme Court has specifically approved requiring a criminal 
defendant to present all of his collateral claims in a single post-conviction proceeding. In 
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court, discussing federal habeas corpus 
proceedings which prohibit piecemeal litigation by requiring that all claims be brought in 
a single petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explained the respective states can employ a 
similar procedure for post-conviction relief procedures. The Court concluded: 
There can be no doubt that States may likewise provide, as Maine 
has done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all 
known constitutional claims in a single proceeding. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals agreed that the Maine statutory scheme was an "orderly 
procedure of the state courts," as that term is used in Fay v. Noia, [372 
U.S. 391, 438, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963)l. No prisoner 
has a right either under the Federal Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. $2241 
to insist upon piecemeal collateral attack on a presumptively valid 
criminal conviction in the face of such a statutory provision. 
Id. at 45-46. 
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Idaho Code 5 19-2719 also bas a great deal of interplay with federal habeas law. 
The ability of states to ensure their judgments carry a measure of finality rather than 
being subject to repetitive federal attack, depends on the regular and consistent 
enforcement of state procedural rules and bars. Addressing the interplay between state 
procedural bars and federal review, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 
U.S. 578,587 (1988), refused to honor a state procedural bar, and explained: 
[W]e consider whether that bar provides an adequate and independent 
state ground for the refusal to vacate petitioner's sentence. "[Wle have 
consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in 
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a 
federal question is itself a federal question." Henry v. Mississippi, 379 
U.S. 443, 447, [85 S. Ct. 564, 567, 13 L. Ed. 2d 4081 (1965). "[A] state 
procedural ground is not 'adequate' unless the procedural rule is 'strictly 
or regularly followed.' Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, [84 
S. Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 L. Ed. 2d 7661 (1964)." Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 
U.S. 255, 262-263, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2426-2427, 72 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1982); 
see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 447-448, 85 S. Ct. at 567-568. We 
find no evidence that the procedural bar relied on by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court here has been consistently or regularly applied. Rather, 
the weight of Mississippi law is to the contrary. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has historically followed the requirements of I.C. 5 19- 
2719, strictly and regularly dismissing successive capital post-conviction relief claims 
because of petitioners' failure to meet the narrow exception of I.C. fj 19-2719(5). See 
e.g., Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 51 P.3d 387 (2002); Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 
299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000); Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996); Pizzuto v. 
m, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100, 897 P.2d 
991 (1995); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); Fetterlv v. State, 121 
Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991). The Court has also historically followed the 
requirements of I.C. 5 19-2719, strictly and regularly affirming the district courts' 
dismissal of successive capital post-conviction claims because of petitioners' failure to 
meet the narrow exceptions of I.C. 3 19-2719(5), including the pleading requirements of 
I.C. $5 19-2719(5)(a) and (b). See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000); 
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 
P.3d 636 (2000); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,992 P.2d 144 (1999). 
Pizzuto contends his sixth post-conviction petition is not governed by I.C. $ 19- 
2719 because, "The manifest injustice language [of I.C. 5 19-4901(4)] is not precluded by 
I.C. 5 19-2719 and is therefore available in capital cases." (Appellant's brief, p.47.) 
Assuming without conceding I.C. 5 19-4901(4) permits the filing of a successive post- 
conviction petition in non-capital cases, the filing of a successive post-conviction petition 
1n a capital case is governed exclusively by I.C. § 19-2719 and is "allowed only where 
the petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or could not 
reasonably have been known within the 42-day time frame." McKinnev, 133 Idaho at 
700-01 (emphasis added). The only exception permitting the filing of a successive post- 
conviction petition in a capital case is for claims that were not known or could not 
reasonably have been known within the forty-two day requirement of I.C. 5 19-2719. 
There are no exceptions for "manifest injustice," ''fundamental error," "plain error" or 
any exception other than a claim that was not known or could not reasonably have been 
known at the time the initial post-conviction petition was filed. 
Pizzuto's reliance upon S&ak, 134 Idaho at 647, is likewise unavailing. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has never stated it would "consider claims notwithstanding Idaho 
Code Section 19-2719." (Appellant's brief, p.47.) Rather, && merely stands for the 
proposition that a defendant can resurrect an old claim with newly discovered evidence if 
that evidence was not known and could not reasonably have been known when the first 
post-conviction petition was filed. Id. at 647 (rejecting the state's theory that Sivak 
waived his claim for relief "merely because he raised the issue in his first post-conviction 
petition"). does not establish an independent exception to I.C. 5 19-2719 based 
upon "manifest injustice," "egregious injustice." or any other exception except claims 
that are based upon new facts that were not known and reasonably could not have been 
known when the first post-conviction petition was filed. 
D. This Court Should Dismiss The Instant Appeal Without Addressing The Merits 
Of Pizzuto's Claims In His Successive Petition 
A capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has 
a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that 
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 
471; see also McKinnev, 133 Idaho at 701. If a petitioner fails to make the requisite 
showing, "The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for 
relief." J.C. 5 19-2719(5). In m, 121 Idaho at 419, the court recognized the 
petitioner's failure to raise the issues in his first petition for post-conviction relief resulted 
in a waiver of the issues. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal. Id. at 419. In &, 
the petitioner filed a motion to stay execution after the district court dismissed his second 
petition for post-conviction relief. Shortly thereafter, the supreme court ordered the 
respective parties to simultaneously file briefs addressing the question of whether there 
were new grounds for post-conviction relief. After reviewing the briefing and hearing 
oral argument addressing only the jurisdictional issue, the Idaho Supreme Court 
dismissed Paz's appeal. Id., 123 Idaho at 758-60. In Lankford, 127 Idaho at 101, the 
state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal alleging 1.C. 5 19-2719 barred consideration of 
the petitioner's successive petition. After reviewing the claims asserted in the successive 
petition and the supporting documents, the court concluded Lankford "failed to assert any 
claim not barred by I.C. § 19-2719," and dismissed his appeal. Id. at 102. 
By dismissing a petitioner's appeal from the denial ^of a successive petition for 
post-conviction relief, this Court sends a clear message to the federal courts of its intent 
to consistently apply the procedural bar associated with I.C. 5 19-2719 and that the basis 
for the decision is the procedural bar, not federal law. See Coleman V. Thomuson, 501 
U.S. 722 (1991). The Supreme Court has recognized, "It is not always easy for a federal 
court to apply the independent and adequate state ground doctrine." Id. at 732. 
However, when this Court explicitly invokes the state procedural bar, the state decision is 
based upon an independent and adequate state rule even if the Court alternatively 
addresses the merits of a federal claim. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989). 
When this Court's opinions addressing successive post-conviction petitions do not "fairly 
appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law," it cannot be 
presumed the court based its decision on federal law. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735. 
However, when, as in Coleman, 501 U.S. at 740-41, this Court "state[s] plainly it [is] 
granting the [state's] motion to dismiss the . . . appeal," the federal courts recognize the 
Court's application of I.C. 5 19-2719 and that it is an independent and adequate state 
doctrine. 
Pizzuto's failure to make a prima facie showing that the claims in his successive 
petition comply with the dictates of I.C. 5 19-2719 requires dismissal of his appeal. 
E. Pizzuto Has Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showing That His Successive Post- 
Conviction Claims Are Not Barred Bv I.C. 6 19-2719 
1. Pizzuto's Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Were Known Or Reasonably 
Could Have Been Known When He Filed His First Petition 
As explained in McKinnev, 133 Idaho at 706-07, "Even if the State violated 
[Pizzuto's] right to due process . . . , [Pizzuto] was required to raise this issue, like other 
constitutional issues, within the time frame mandated by I.C. 5 19-2719." See also 
m, 136 Idaho at 261. In a successive petition for post-conviction relief, Pizzuto is 
required to "make the required prima facie showing that the issues could not reasonably 
have been known during the first proceeding." McKinney, 133 Idaho at 707. Therefore, 
this Court must "initially examine[ ] whether the information alleged by [Pizzuto] to be 
exculpatory reasonably should have been known at the time of [Pizzuto's] first post- 
conviction petition." m, 136 Idaho at 261. 
In his first two claims, Pizzuto contends the state withheld exculpatory evidence 
by failing to disclose an alleged deal with Rice involving a twenty-year sentence, that the 
state knowingly introduced false evidence regarding the benefits conferred upon Rice 
from the alleged plea agreement, and the state knowingly introduced false evidence 
regarding blood found in the cabin where the Herndons were murdered and on Pizzuto's 
clothes. (if34845, R., pp.400-01.) 
a. The Alleged "Deal" With Rice 
Pizzuto's claim regarding the alleged deal with Rice is based upon Rice's 
affidavit, the affidavit of his former wife, Joy Tara, and notes and billings from Rice's 
former attorney. (#34845, R., pp.392-97.) However, Pizzuto failed to explain why the 
information from Rice, Tara, and the notes and billings could not have been presented 
during his first post-conviction proceedings. Admittedly paragraph fifteen of Rice's 
affidavit states: 
I was contacted once in the past by an investigator for the Capital 
Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders of the Eastern District of 
Washington and Idaho while I was serving my prison sentence on the 
Second Degree murder conviction out of Idaho. I did not tell the 
investigator about my deal because I did not want to jeopardize my parole. 
After I was released from prison, I did not seek to tell anyone about the 
deal because I might need the Idaho authorities to vouch for me one day. 
In fact, I was charged in a criminal case in California and my attorney did 
ask the prosecutor, Henry Boomer, to help me with my case. Now, I am 
in prison for life because I was a three strikes defendant, and I have 
nothing to lose by coming forward with the truth. I also don't think 
Gerald Pizzuto should die because he was put up to the crime by Bill 
Odom. 
(#34845, R., pp.33-34.) 
Rice's affidavit was allegedly signed on September 28, 2005. Id. However, in 
the margin of Rice's affidavit at the beginning of paragraph fifteen is the handwritten 
word, "Excluding" with the handwritten initials "JR." (#34845, R., p.33.) This reveals 
Rice disavowed the contents of paragraph fifteen. Therefore, Pizzuto provided the 
district court with no admissible evidence that Rice previously refused to disclose the 
alleged "deal" with the prosecutor. Admittedly, Rice allegedly signed another affidavit in 
which he attempted to explain his use of the word, "Excluding." (#34845, R., pp.478- 
79.) However, Rice's explanation is somewhat vague and convoluted; he never expressly 
stated he was previously asked by any investigator regarding his alleged "deal" and then 
refused to answer the question or deliberately lied regarding the alleged deal. Moreover, 
it is clear from the Affidavit of Richard S. Ilays that any investigation regarding Rice's 
alleged plea agreement was not even commenced until 1997, more than eleven years after 
Pizzuto's first post-conviction petition was filed. (#34845, R., p.481.) Therefore, even if 
Rice had been more forthcoming, Pizzuto would not have raised the claim in his first 
petition because he failed to even question Rice until December 2, 1997. 
Further, there is no evidence the information in Tara's affidavit was not available 
when Pizmto filed his first post-conviction petition. While she states she was "hiding 
from him (Rice)," Tara attended Rice's sentencing hearing (#34845, R., pp.36-39), and 
there is evidence he was in prison for at least fourteen years after his sentencing hearing, 
negating the need to hide from him when Pizzuto filed his first post-conviction petition in 
1986. This information was available at the time Pizzuto filed his first petition. 
Finally, there is nothing suggesting the notes and billings from Rice's attomeys 
were not available when Pizzuto filed his first post-conviction petition. The billings are 
matters of public record that could have been obtained from the Idaho County Clerk. In 
fact, Pizzuto filed an affidavit from Julie Kaschrnitter, an employer of Rice's former 
attomeys, which merely confirms the documents are "records from our former files" and 
does not indicate when they were actually obtained by Pizzuto or that they could not have 
been obtained when he filed his first post-conviction petition. (#34845, R., p.41.) 
All of this information is indistinguishable from the evidence Pizzuto tried to use 
in his third post-conviction petition when he attempted to raise a claim based upon Brady 
regarding evidence the state allegedly withheld involving Rice and Odom. See m, 
134 Idaho at 796. The supreme court examined that evidence and recognized it was 
available in earlier post-conviction proceedings from a variety of sources, at 798. 
Based upon the information Pizzuto presented to the district court, he has again failed to 
make a prima facie showing the information supporting the alleged "deal" was not 
known or could not reasonably have been known when he filed his first post-conviction 
petition. 
b. The Blood Evidence 
The entirety of Pizmto's "blood evidence" claim is as follows: 
The prosecution further violated Mr. Pizzuto's due process and 
Sixth Amendment rights by knowingly introducing false evidence 
regarding blood found in the cabin where the murders supposedly 
occurred, and false evidence regarding blood found on what it asserted 
were petitioner's clothes. 
(#34845, R., p.401.) 
There is no reference regarding what "false evidence regarding blood" was 
actually presented by the state. While Pizzuto took great pains to discuss the blood 
evidence actually presented at trial (#34845, R., pp.397-400), there is nothing in his 
explanation indicating there is new or additional evidence that was not presented to the 
jury. Rather, his explanation is filled with speculation and innuendo that is not supported 
by facts and, for the most part, was presented at trial. In fact, while he at least attempted 
to explain why his claim regarding the alleged "deal" with Rice is timely (#34845, R., 
pp.389-90), Pizzuto made no such attempt regarding his "blood evidence" claim. 
Pizzuto attempted to bolster his claim with additional affidavits. However, he has 
failed to explain why the information in the affidavits could not have been discovered 
when he filed his first post-conviction petition. For example, Pizzuto has failed to 
explain why the information from ihe respective jurors could not have been discovered 
when his first petition was filed. Nor does Pizzuto explain why he could not have 
uncovered the information in James H. Howell's affidavit, one of the bailiffs at Pizzuto's 
trial, when the first petition was filed. The information in the affidavits challenging the 
work and character of former Sheriff Randy Baldwin could readily have been discovered 
prior to the filing of the first petition, including, for example, the affidavits of Buck 
Kelty, Robert Meinen and David Riley. The affidavit of criminalist Kay M. Sweeney 
particularly reveals Pizzuto is merely attempting to delay the completion of his case 
under the guise of reinvestigating his case years after the time limitations have expired. 
P i m t o  should not be permitted to wait twenty years to hire another expert to 
reinvestigate the forensic evidence associated with his case. This is exactly the type of 
delay tactics I.C. 5 19-2719 is designed to prohibit. 
Pizzuto has failed to make aprimafacie showing that his "blood evidence" claim 
was not known or reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first post- 
conviction petition. 
2. Pizzuto's Judicial Misconduct Claims Were Known Or Reasonably Could 
Have Been Known When He Filed His First Petition 
Pizzuto's third claim regarding judicial misconduct is also based upon the alleged 
"deal" with Rice. (#34845, R., p.402.) As detailed above, because he has failed to make 
a prima facie showing that the facts regarding Rice's alleged "deal" and the alleged 
"supporting evidence" were not known or reasonably could not have been known when 
he filed his first post-conviction petition, Pizzuto's third claim was properly dismissed. 
Judge Williamson also cobbled together a judicial bias claim based upon a single 
sentence in Pizzuto's third claim, "Judge Reinhardt was biased against Mr. Pizzuto" 
(#34845, R., p.402) and the Affidavit of Angellina Rawson, Pizzuto's sister, in which she 
recounts an alleged dinner with the prosecutor, sheriff and Judge Reinhardt during which 
Judge Reinhardt allegedly stated, "something to the whole group about how he was going 
to 'hang' my brother Jerry" (#34845, R., p.293). Irrespective of whether this claim is 
contained in Pizzuto's amended petition, it was known or reasonably could have been 
known when he filed his first post-conviction petition. Rawson's affidavit states: 
15. I have not come forward until now for many reasons. After the 
trial, I tried to disappear. I didn't want to be found. I moved around a lot, 
from California, where I informed on a drug dealer in exchange for drug 
charges being dropped against me, to Kodiak Island, Alaska, to Tacoma, 
Washington. 1 continued to be a drug addict and alcoholic. I was 
depressed and suicidal. I had to deal with serious illness and disease. I 
suffered through a rape and serious beating. About f o u  years ago, I 
moved to Juneau, Alaska and decided to straighten my life out. I am now 
under the care of doctors and counselors, and have an in-home caretaker. 
I am only now at a place where I can talk about this[.] 
(#34845, R., p.294.) 
While Rawson's affidavit discusses what she allegedly did after her brother's 
trial, there is no information detailing what efforts Pizzuto or his multiple attorneys took 
in locating and talking with Rawson or if she had contact with her brother while he was 
in prison awaiting the completion of his multiple appeals. Pizmto's presumed failure to 
contact Rawson and learn of this claim is particularly perplexing considering this is not 
the first time a member of his family contended Judge Reinhardt made a disparaging 
remark about Pizzuto. In September 1993, three family members made similar 
allegations including: (1) Gerald Pizzuto, Sr., Pizmto's father; (2) Pamela R. Pizzuto, 
Pizmto's mother; and (3) Tony J. King, Pizzuto's sister. (#24802, R., pp.179-84.) The 
family members contended Judge Reinhardt "told them that Pizzuto was a 'murderer,' 
'scum,' and that 'they were going to burn' Pizzuto." (#24802, R., pp.179-84.) Based 
upon the family members' affidavits, Pizzuto raised a claim in his successive petition that 
he was tried and sentenced by an impartial judge. (#21637, R., pp.15-16.)'0 Addressing 
this claim of "impartial judge" on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded it was a 
claim "that should be immediately apparent upon the completion of trial and sentencing." 
m, 127 Idaho at 470. 
If the claim of judicial bias based upon the allegations of the three other family 
members was a claim that was known or could reasonably have been known at the time 
The three family members' affidavits are not contained in the Clerk's Record of 
Pizzuto's second post-conviction case, but are contained in the Clerk's Record in his third 
post-conviction case. (#24802, R., pp.179-84.) 
of Pizzuto's first post-conviction case, the instant claim based upon the allegation of a 
fourth family member is indistinguishable and had to be summarily dismissed. Based 
upon the allegations of Pizzuto's three family members, it would have been objectively 
reasonable for Pizzuto's attorneys to conduct additional investigation by contacting other 
witnesses, including Rawson. However, on the eve of his execution Pizzuto is merely 
attempting to resurrect the same claim raised by other family members that was known or 
reasonably could have been known when his first post-conviction petition was filed. 
Further, Pizzuto's current counsel, Joan Fisher, filed an affidavit explaining she 
was appointed as his habeas attorney nine years ago and "directed that as complete a 
factual investigation including acquisition of prosecutorial files and interviews with the 
co-defendants be conducted as soon as practicable." (#34845, R., p.672, exhibit 11, 
which included Appendix B, Affidavit of Joan M. Fisher, p.2.) Based upon Fisher's 
affidavit and the allegations made by Pizzuto's three family members, it is unfathomable 
Rawson could not reasonably have been contacted until the eve of her brother's 
execution." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has implicitly recognized counsel cannot simply wait 
for information to come forward. Rather, the court has repeatedly explained counsel has 
a duty to investigate all claims during the first post-conviction petition proceedings. For 
example, evidence offered at a co-defendant's trial supporting a claim that the state 
withheld exculpatory evidence was known or reasonably could have been known within 
" The Idaho Supreme Court again addressed the issue of the three family members' 
affidavits in his fifth post-conviction case involving Atkins, and concluded, "Pizzuto has 
known of the statements attributed to Judge Reinhardt since his trial. He has had ample 
opportunity to assert they are evidence of bias in his first and third post-conviction 
proceedings, and he chose not to do so. He has therefore waived any claim of bias based 
upon those alleged statements." Pizzuto V, 2008 WL 466568, *5. 
the time frame allowed by I.C. § 19-2719; post-conviction counsel merely had lo attend 
the co-defendant's trial or obtain relevant transcripts. See McKinney, 133 Idaho at 707. 
In Pizzuto's third post-conviction petition he raised claims regarding the withholding of 
exculpatory evidence, which the Idaho Supreme Court concluded could reasonably have 
been known if his counsel had simply examined other court files from his co-defendants. 
Pizzuto, 134 Idaho at 798. In Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 261, 32 P.3d 151 (2001), 
counsel merely had to write a letter to the local sheriff and call the Idaho Department of 
Law Enforcement to obtain relevant information. Therefore, the supreme court 
concluded the claims reasonably should have been known at the time the first post- 
conviction petition was filed. @. 
Pizzuto has failed to establish the information provided by Rawson was not 
known or could not reasonably have been known when he filed his first post-conviction 
petition, requiring that it be dismissed, with his other claims, on appeal. 
3 .  Denial Of Due Process And An Impartial Judge 
Pizzuto's fourth claim is based upon "[tlhe continued assignment of this case and 
its related postconviction proceedings to Judge Reinhardt over the insistent objections of 
Mr. Pizzuto including ex parte contacts and bias and prejudice." (#34845, R., p.402.) 
This claim is nothing more than a renewed attempt to relitigate Pizzuto's prior attempts to 
disqualify Judge Reinhardt. Clearly, this claim was known or reasonably should have 
been known, and arguably, was actually raised in prior post-conviction cases. 
4. Cumulative Enor 
The entirety of Pizzuto's fifth claim reads as follows: 
The cumulative impact of the errors asserted herein violates 
Petitioner's rights to Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and comparable rights 
under the Idaho Constitution. 
(#34845, R., p.403.) 
Because Pizzuto has failed to meet his burden of establishing any of his claims 
meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2719, he has likewise failed to establish any 
"cumulative impact" associated with those claims was not known or reasonably could not 
have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition. 
5 .  Pizzuto's Actual Innocence Claim Was Known Or Reasonably Could 
Have Been Known When He Filed His First Petition 
Pizzuto's actual innocence claim is premised upon the allegation that Rice's 
testimony is "not credible" based upon the alleged "deal," Odom allegedly being a paid 
informant and false blood evidence allegedly being presented by the state. (#34845, R., 
pp.403-04.) As detailed above, Pizzuto has failed to make aprimafacie showing that the 
facts regarding Rice's alleged "deal" and the alleged "supporting evidence" were not 
known or reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first post-conviction 
petition. Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has already determined the claim regarding 
Odom allegedly being a paid informant was information that "could have been 
discovered much earlier by reviewing Odom's case file, which is on the public record." 
Pizzuto, 134 Idaho at 798. Finally, as detailed above, Pizzuto has failed to make aprima 
facie showing that the facts regarding the blood evidence were not known or reasonably 
could not have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition. The evidence 
regarding the blood evidence was presented to the jury, which, based upon its guilty 
verdicts, rejected any allegation that something was inherently wrong with the evidence. 
F. Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish The Claims In His Successive Petition Were 
Timely Filed 
Even if the claims in Pizzuto's successive post-conviction petition were not 
known and could not reasonably have been known when he filed his first post-conviction 
petition, none of the claims have been asserted within a reasonable time after they were 
known or reasonably could have been known. In &, 123 Idaho at 760, the supreme 
court recognized I.C. 5 19-2719 "implicitly establishes a framework for timeliness" for 
the filing of successive post-conviction petitions or claims. While not setting forth a 
specific time frame, the court concluded four years is not a reasonable period of time. Id. 
More recently, "following the principle from Paz," the supreme court concluded, "a two- 
and-one-half-year span from the date of the first appellate brief to the assertion of claims 
is an unreasonable length of time for the pursuit of post-conviction relief," Fields, 135 
Idaho at 290. In Dunlau v. State, 131 Idaho 576, 577,961 P.2d 1179 (1998), the supreme 
co~ut  concluded a petition filed within forty-two days after the appointment of new 
counsel was a reasonable time "under the circumstances of [the] case." In Rhoades, 135 
Idaho at 301, the supreme c o w  concluded a petitioner failed to show "justifiable reason 
for the six-month delay in filing" a successive post-conviction petition. However, as 
explained above, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently concluded a "reasonable time" 
"is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the 
claim." Pizzuto V, 2008 WL 466568, *6. 
Pizzuto contends he first became aware of Rice's alleged "deal" when Rice 
"acknowledged under oath on the ~ 8 ' ~  day of September, 2005." (#34845, R., p.389.) 
However, Pizzuto did not file his post-conviction petition until November 25, 2005 
(#34845, R., p.8), fifty-three days after Rice signed the affidavit, which is obviously 
beyond the forty-two day limitation period of I.C. 5 19-2719. This does not include the 
time between the undisclosed date of the investigator's interview in September and the 
date Rice actually signed the affidavit. 
Even if this Court rejects the state's forty-two-day argument, the claims raised in 
Pizzuto's successive post-conviction petition were not timely filed. Assuming this Court 
considers "excluded" paragraph fifteen of Rice's affidavit, Pizzuto has still failed to 
provide this Court with any evidence of when Rice was charged in the California criminal 
case, sentenced to life as a three strikes defendant and decided he had "nothing to lose by 
coming forward with the truth." (#34845, R., p.34.) Presumably, Pizzuto has failed to 
provide this information because he knows the information was available long before the 
filing of his current successive petition and he cannot meet the requisite time period for 
filing a successive petition. Based upon his failure to timely file his successive petition, 
as with his third post-conviction petition, see Pizzuto, 134 Idaho at 798-99, the claims 
must be dismissed on appeal. 
G. Because Pizzuto's Petition Alleges Matters That Are Merely Impeaching., His 
Petition Is Facially Insufficient, Requiring. Dismissal 
Idaho Code 5 19-2719(5)(b) further limits the ability of a capital petitioner to file 
a successive post-conviction petition. The statute reads as follows: 
A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall 
be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it alleges matters that are 
cumulative or impeaching. . . . 
The Idaho Court of Appeals expressly addressed what constitutes "impeaching 
evidence" in Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 334-35, 971 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(quoting Zimmerman v. Marico~a County Superior Ct., 402 P.2d 212,215 (1965)): 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of 
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which the 
determination of the tribunal is asked, impeachment is that which is 
designed to discredit a witness, i.e., to reduce the effectiveness of his 
testimony by bringing forth evidence which explains why the jury should 
not put faith in him or his testimony. Examples of impeachment evidence 
would include prior inconsistent statements, bias, attacks on [the] 
character of a witness, prior felony convictions, and attacks on the 
capacity of the witness to observe, recall or relate. 
As further explained in State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 136, 44 P.3d 1180 (Ct. 
App. 2002), "Impeachment evidence is offered to attack the credibility of the witness 
rather than to establish the existence or nonexistence of a disputed fact." See also State v. 
Roberts, 129 Idaho 325, 331, 924 P.2d 226 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Impeachment evidence is 
that which is offered to attack the credibility of a witness rather than to establish the 
existence or non-existence of a disputed fact"). 
In m, 134 Idaho at 644, the petitioner claimed his right to due process was 
violated based upon the withholding of allegedly exculpatory evidence in violation of 
w. However, the court concluded the underlying basis of Sivak's claim, four 
allegedly newly discovered letters, was "only cumulative evidence within the meaning of 
I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(b)." m, 134 Idaho at 648. "Therefore, Sivak's petition based on 
the suppression of this evidence was barred under the operation of I.C. 5 19-2719(5)." 
Id. at 649; see also Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 577, 21 P.3d 895 (2001) (dismissing 
-
claim under I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(b) because the evidence was "merely impeaching"). 
In his amended successive petition, Pizzuto expressly contends, "The result was 
that petitioner was deprived of crucial impeachment evidence regarding Mr. Rice who 
was the star witness against Mr. Pizzuto." (#34845, R., p.400) (emphasis added). 
Pizzuto further contends, "The undisclosed plea deal constitutes material 
impeachment." (#34845, R., p.401) (emphasis added). Obviously, the "crucial 
impeachment evidence regarding Mr. Rice" involves the alleged "deal" made between 
him and the state, which is intricately intertwined with the other claims in Pizzuto's 
successive petition. However, because I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(b) does not permit the filing of 
a successive post-conviction petition that merely alleges matters which are impeaching, 
P imto ,  134 Idaho at 797, Pizzuto's petition must be dismissed on appeal. 
H. Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish I.C. 6 19-2719 Violates Either The State Or 
Federal Constitutions 
Pizzuto raises several constitutional challenges to I.C. $ 19-2719, including: (1) 
denial of equal protection and due process; (2) vagueness; and (3) the improper 
"grafting" of the "reasonable time" limit for the filing of successive petitions. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.55-57.) Because these arguments have been repeatedly rejected by 
the Idaho Supreme Court, they are without merit. 
1. Due Process And Esual Protection 
Based upon the alleged "manifest injustice exception" of I.C. 19-4901(4), Pizzuto 
contends LC. 19-2719(5) violates his equal protection and due process rights. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.55-56.) In h, 115 Idaho at 21 1-13, the court expressly held 
I.C. $ 19-2719 does not violate equal protection. In Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 806, the court 
expressly concluded I.C. $ 19-2719 does not violate due process. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has repeatedly affirmed both of these cases. See Hairston, 144 Idaho at 55; 
Lankford, 127 Idaho at 102; State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638,647, 851 P.2d 934 (1993); 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,430-31, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991); State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 
63,72,822 P.2d 960 (1991); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542,559,798 P.2d 1 (1990); 
Fetterlv, 115 Idaho 231, 235-36, 766 P.2d 701 (1988). Because Pizzuto has failed to 
even cite these cases, he obviously has failed to provide any argument as to why they are 
not controlling or should be reconsidered. 
2. Vagueness 
Pizzuto contends I.C. 4 19-271 9(5) "imposes an internally inconsistent standard 
of 'known' or 'should reasonably have been known,' in subseclion (5) versus a standard 
of reasonably 'could' have been known in subsection (5)(a)" making it "impossible to 
glean from the statute or case law regarding [the] 19-2719 waiver standard what 'should 
reasonably have been known' requires." (Appellant's brief, pp.56-57.) This argument 
has also been rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hairston, 144 Idaho at 57. Because 
Pizzuto has failed to even cite Hairston, he obviously has failed to provide any argument 
as to why it is not controlling or should be reconsidered. 
3. "Reasonable Time" Reaui- 
Pizzuto concedes his argument, that the "reasonable time" standard is 
unconstitutionally vague, was rejected in Pizzuto V, 2008 WL 466568, *6, but 
"incorporates herein the argument made in that case and urges reconsideration of the 
issue." (Appellant's brief, p.57.) Because Pizzuto has failed to explain, with argument 
and citation to authority, why this Court should reconsider an issue decided just last year, 
his claims fail. See State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 19, 966 P.2d 1 (1998) (citing State v. 
m, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966 (1996)) (failure to cite proper authority to 
support an argument results in waiver of the issue). 
This Court Is Precluded From Addressing The Merits Of Pizzuto's Appeal Because Of 
His Failure To Provide A Statement Of The Issues In His Brief On Appeal 
Should this Court decline to dismiss Pizzuto's appeal based upon his failure to 
pass the procedural hurdles of I.C. 19-2719, the district judges' decisions must be 
affirmed because of his failure to comply with basic appellate rules of procedure. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a) governs the content of an appellant's brief and 
mandates that all appellant's briefs contain a short and concise list of the issues presented 
on appeal. In relevant part, the rule reads as follows: 
The brief of the appellant shall contain the following divisions 
under appropriate headings: 
A list of the issues presented on appeal, expressed 
in the terms and circumstances of the case but without 
unnecessary detail. The statement of the issues shall be 
short and concise, and should not be repetitious. The issues 
shall fairly state the issues presented for review. The 
statement of issues presented will be deemed to include 
every subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein. 
I.A.R. 35(a)(4). 
"When an appellant fails to list the issues it wants this Court to address in a 
statement of issues in its brief, as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4), we may decline to consider 
the issue." Lowder v. Minidoka County Joint School Dist., 132 Idaho 834, 840,979 P.2d 
1192 (1999); see also Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 691, 809 P.2d 1166 (Ct. App. 
1991) (refusing to consider an issue which was argued in the body of the appellant's 
brief, but not set out in the statement of issues). Moreover, raising the issue in the 
appellant's reply brief "does not cure the defect." Rowlev v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 
108,982 P.2d 940 (1999). 
While the "rule will be relaxed when the issues are supported by argument in the 
briefs," Rhead v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 135 Idaho 446, 452, 19 P.3d 
760 (2001), based upon the convoluted and vague nature of Pizzuto's arguments, he is 
not entitled to "relaxation" of the rule. Pizzuto's appellate attorney is a seasoned capital 
litigator who has filed hundreds of briefs with multiple appellate courts. However, 
instead of addressing the parameters of I.C. $ 19-2719, which was the primary basis of 
the district judges' decisions, she spent the vast majority of the brief addressing the 
merits of Pizzuto's claims. Therefore, this Court should decline to address any of the 
arguments that are raised in Pizzuto's brief. Alternatively, should this Court "relax" 
I.A.R. 35(a)(4), PIZZLI~O'S arguments should be very narrowly construed. 
Because Pizzuto Failed To Establish A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding His 
"Judicial Misconduct" Claim. It Fails On The Merits 
A. Introduction 
Apparently uniting his third and fourth claims from his amended successive 
petition, Pizzuto contends there are "unrefuted allegations that Judge Reinhardt expressed 
hostility toward Mr. Pizzuto, directed and orchestrated the plea negotiation and blood 
evidence investigation, and decided to impose the death penalty in advance of the 
sentencing hearing, [which] compel[s] the conclusion that Mr. Pizzuto was not tried by 
an impartial judge, in violation of due process." (Appellant's brief, p.21.) 
Assuming Pizzuto overcomes the procedural bars associated with I.C. 3 19-2719 
and this Court "relaxes" the requirements of 1.A.R. 35(a)(4), Pizzuto's claim fails because 
he has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) (quoting 
Savkhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 900 P.2d 795 (1995)), the supreme court 
reaffirmed the standard of review in post-conviction cases in which summary dismissal 
was granted by the trial court: 
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly 
granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the 
petitioner, and determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if 
accepted as true. A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted 
allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. The 
standard to be applied to a trial court's determination that no material issue 
of fact exists is the same type of determination as in a summary judgment 
proceeding. (citations omitted throughout). 
C. The Claim Of Judicial Bias Based Uvon Rawson's Affidavit Was Not Proverly 
Pled In The Amended Successive Petition 
Before addressing the merits of Pizzuto's arguments regarding judicial bias, it is 
necessary to review what was actually pled in his amended successive petition and 
whether the claim of judicial bias based upon Rawson's affidavit was pled in the petition. 
Idaho Code 5 19-4903, which governs the content of a post-conviction petition, 
states: 
The application shall identify the proceedings in which the 
applicant was convicted, give the date of the entry of the judgment and 
sentence complained of, specifically set forth the grounds upon which 
the application is based, and clearly state the relief desired. Facts within 
the personal knowledge of the applicant shall be set forth separately from 
other allegations of facts and shall be verified as provided in section 19- 
4902. Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations 
shall be attached to the application or the application shall recite why they 
are not attached. The application shall identify all previous proceedings, 
together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by the applicant to secure 
relief from his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and 
discussion of authorities are unnecessary. 
(Emphasis added). 
In Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 91, 137 P.3d 475 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis 
added), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted petitioners must prove, by a preponderance of 
evidence, the allegations upon which a request for relief is based, and then explained: 
This proof must begin with the petition itself. The petition for post- 
conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal 
knowledge of the petitioner, and afidavits, records or other evidence 
supporting its allegations must be attached, or the petition must state why 
such supporting evidence is not included. I.C. 5 19-4903. In other 
words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or it will be subject to dismissal. 
Discussing I.C. $ 19-4903, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "An 
application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. 
The application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the 
claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l)." Dunlap, 141 Idaho 50, 
56, 106 P.3d 376 (2004) (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The court of appeals has also concluded: 
We have often observed that I.C. 5 19-4903 requires that an 
application for post-conviction relief contain more than a 'short and 
plain statement of the claim' that would suffice for a complaint under 
R P  ( a ) ( ) .  An application for post-conviction relief is required to 
be verified with respect to the facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its 
allegations must be attached, or the application must state why the 
supporting evidence is absent. 
Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 792, 992 P.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added); 
see also Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 330-31, 971 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Based upon I.C. 5 19-4903 and its interpretive case law, the petition itself must 
set forth the claims, while affidavits are filed to merely support the claims, not raise new 
or additional claims that are not contained within the petition itself. See &, 135 Idaho 
at 579 ("In this case, the petition listed various issues that Row desired to raise regarding 
the effectiveness of her appellate counsel, but it did not include, nor was it accompanied 
by, sworn statements setting forth the material facts supporting those issues"). 
Pizzuto's "GROUNDS FOR RELIEF" commence on page six of his amended 
successive petition, beginning with a recitation of "FACTS." (#34845, R., p.391.) The 
only reference to Rawson or her affidavit is on page fourteen of the amended petition and 
refers only to the ownership of a shirt and belt admitted at Pizzuto's trial; no reference is 
made to the alleged dinner or an allegation stemming from the alleged events at the 
dinner. Pizzuto's "CLAIMS" commence on page fifteen of his amended petition, 
beginning with the allegation that the state withheld exculpatory information based upon 
the alleged "twenty-year deal" with Rice. ($34845, R., pp.400-01.) Pizzuto's second 
claim raises "prosecutorial misconduct" based upon the alleged "twenty-year-deal" with 
Rice and the alleged introduction of false blood evidence found in the cabin and on 
Pizzuto's clothing. (#34845, R., p.401.) In Pizzuto's third claim, he raises "judicial 
misconduct," based exclusively upon four allegations: (1) Judge Reinhardt's participation 
in "off the record plea negotiations with Mr. Rice's defense counsel;" (2) creation of a 
guilty plea record that was "deliberately misleading about the deal Mr. Rice was to 
receive;" (3) standing by "while the prosecutor used deliberately false testimony to 
convict Mr. Pizzuto;" and (4) engaging in ex parte contact with jurors during and 
following their verdict, but before sentencing. (#34845, R., p.402.) There is no mention 
of Rawson or an allegation of judicial misconduct based upon the alleged dinner events. 
In his fourth claim, Pizzuto raises a due process claim based upon Judge Reinhardt's 
"continued assignment of this case and its related postconviction proceedings. (#34845, 
R., pp.402-03.) His fifth claim raises cumulative error. (#34845, R., p.403.) Pizzuto's 
final claim is "actual innocence," based upon: (1) Rice's testimony not being credible 
because of the alleged "twenty-year deal;" (2) Odom being a paid informant; and (3) the 
state allegedly producing false blood evidence. (#34845, R., pp.403-04.) 
While there is a reference to Rawson's affidavit as one of several "SUPPORTING 
AFFIDAVITS DOCUMENTATION" (#34845, R., p.404), there is no other reference to 
Rawson or judicial misconduct associated with the alleged dinner. 
Pizzuto contended he filed his amended petition based upon the following: 
(1) to correct factual mis-statement in the petition; 
(2) to incorporate recently discovered evidence as a result of the 
continuing investigation; 
(3) to more fully and clearly set forth the factual and legal grounds 
upon which Petitioner seeks relief and its full and complete presentation of 
every claim now known to Petitioner not previously presented to this 
Court. 
(#34845, R., pp.369-70.) 
While Pizzuto clearly stated the amended petition was designed to "fully and 
clearly set forth the factual and legal grounds upon which Petitioner seeks relief and its 
full and complete presentation of every claim now known to Petitioner not previously 
presented to this Court" (#34845, R., p.3701, there is no further reference in the amended 
petition to Rawson or the alleged dinner, demonstrating Pizzuto did not intend to raise 
such a claim. Pizzuto's claim of judicial misconduct is only predicated upon the three 
factual allegations described above and asserted in his amended petition. 
While the courts are permitted to give a liberal reading to pro se petitions, Griffin 
v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975 (Ct. App. 2006), Pizzuto's sixth post- 
conviction petition was drafted by an experienced attorney who specializes in capital 
litigation defense. When experienced counsel drafts pleadings and briefs, the courts are 
not permitted to "give them a broad, non-technical interpretation." Wilson v. State, 113 
Idaho 563,565,746 P.2d 1022 (Ct. App. 1987) 
Despite these basis principles and the content of Pizzuto's amended petition, 
Judge Williamson concluded a claim of judicial misconduct, based upon the alleged 
dinner events, was properly pled. (#34845, R., pp.512-13.) Judge Williamson's 
conclusion is particularly troubling because it is based upon non-existent facts. 
Examining Rawson's affidavit, Judge Williamson concluded, "Angelina Pizzuto (dWa 
Rawson) has testified that, while serving as a State's witness, she went to dinner during 
the triat - and before sentencing - with Mr. Boomer, Sheriff Baldwin, and Judge 
Reinhardt." (#34845, R., p.512) (emphasis added.) However, Rawson's affidavit does 
not support this conclusion. The entirety of Rawson's allegation regarding Judge 
Reinhardt's alleged statement reads as follows: 
11. I remember one night when I went out to dinner with Mr. 
Boomer, Sheriff Baldwin, and Judge Reinhardt at the restaurantibar next 
to the motel where I was staying. The group of us had T-bone steaks and 
drinks. We were all having a good time and talking about the case. At the 
end of dinner, Judge Reinhardt said something to the whole group about 
how he was going to "hang" my brother Jerry. The other men heard this 
and all agreed. I recall this part clearly because it upset me. Judge 
Reinhardt left soon after, while the rest of us went from the dining room 
into the bar for a few more drinks. 
(#34845, R., p.293) (emphasis added). 
Outside of the reference to "one night," there is no indication when Judge 
Reinhardt's statement was allegedly made: pretrial, during trial, post-trial but prior to 
sentencing, during sentencing or even post-sentencing. For this reason, it was imperative 
that Pizzuto be required to comply with the pleading requirements in post-conviction 
cases and not rely upon a claim cobbled together from a supporting affidavit that is not 
raised in the petition. Permitting Pizzuto to raise a claim contained only in a supporting 
affidavit defies the heightened pleading requirement required in post-conviction cases, 
which requires "much more than a short and plain statement of the claim." Dunlap, 141 
Idaho at 56. The state should be able to rely upon the petition itself to ascertain the 
allegations being raised in a post-conviction case and not be required to scour affidavits 
for claims, particularly when affidavits are filed only to support the allegations raised in 
the petition and are insufficient to meet the pleading requirements of I.C. 5 19-4903. 
Because the allegations made in Rawson's affidavit were not properly pled claims 
in Pizzuto's amended successive petition, they may not be considered by this court.'' 
D. Standards Of Law Regarding An Impartial Judgg 
In Pizzuto I, 119 Idaho at 776 (internal quotations and citations omitted), the 
Idaho Supreme Court discussed the standards associated with having an impartial judge: 
Should this Court conclude the claim stemming from Rawson's affidavit was properly 
pled in Pizzuto's amended successive petition and he has overcome the procedural bars 
of I.C. 5 19-2719 and I.A.R. 35(a)(4), an evidentiary hearing may be required on this 
portion of his judicial misconduct claim. 
It has been held that the right to due process requires an impartial 
trial judge. However, a judge may not be disqualified for prejudice unless 
it is shown that the prejudice is directed against the party and is of such 
nature and character as would render it improbable that under the 
circumstances the party could have a fair and impartial trial. In order to 
constitute legal bias or prejudice, allegations of prejudice in post- 
conviction and sentence reduction proceedings must state facts that do 
more than simply explain the course of events involved in a criminal trial. 
In Idaho a judge cannot be disqualified for actual prejudice unless it is 
shown that the prejudice is directed against the litigant and is of such a 
nature and character that it would make it impossible for the litigant to get 
a fair trial. Whether the judge's involvement in the defendant's case 
reaches the point where disqualification from further participation in a 
case becomes necessary is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 
E. Pizzuto Has Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding 
"Judicial Misconduct" 
Pizzuto's claims regarding judicial bias and misconduct, as pled in his amended 
successive petition, are primarily based ~lpon the contention that Judge Reinhardt actually 
knew there was an agreement as to the length of Rice's sentence. While there may be 
evidence supporting the allegation that Rice's attorneys met with Judge Reinhardt and the 
prosecutor to discuss a reduced charge, there is no evidence supporting the allegation 
Judge Reinhardt entered into a conspiracy with Rice's attorneys or the prosecutor to 
withhold evidence regarding an actual sentence. 
Rice's attorney's notes reflect that on January 16, 1986, the attorneys met with the 
prosecutor and Judge Reinhardt. (#34845, R., p.42.) However, the notes reflect only that 
Rice would enter a guilty plea to second-degree murder and do not reference any kind of 
sentencing agreement. (Id.) Even Rice's affidavit merely states, "My attorneys, William 
Dee and Wayne MacGregor, told me that they worked it out with the prosecutor that if I 
pled guilty, I would get a sentence of twenty years concurrent on each count." (#34845, 
R., p.3 1 .) The only reference to Judge Reinhardt is that his attorneys "talked about their 
close relationships with the prosecuting attorney and judge and they assured me that I 
could rely on their representations." ($34845, R., p.32.) There is simply no reference 
that Rice's attorneys had a "deal" with Judge Reinhardt regarding the length of Rice's 
sentence. Neither are there any affidavits from Pizzuto's two trial attorneys, the 
prosecutor or Judge Reinhardt. 
Even if Judge Reinhardt "participated in off the record plea negotiations with Mr. 
Rice's defense counsel" (#34845, R., p.402), it does not establish judicial misconduct. 
Further, while ex parte contact with jurors is strongly discouraged, see Gillingham 
Construction, Inc. V. Newby-Wiripins Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 14,25, 121 P.2d 946 
(2005), it does not constitute judicial bias. Simply stated, Pizzuto failed to support this 
claim with sufficient material facts establishing bias on the part of Judge Reinhardt. 
Because Pizzuto Failed To Establish A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Recarding His 
"Prosecutorial Misconduct" Claim, It Fails On The Merits 
A. Introduction 
Apparently uniting his first two claims from his amended successive petition, 
Pizzuto contends the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence by not disclosing the 
alleged "deal" with Rice, and then failed to correct Rice's allegedly false testimony that 
there was no plea agreement. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-29.) 
Assuming Pizzuto overcomes the procedural bars associated with I.C. 5 19-27 19 
and this Court "relaxes" the requirements of I.A.R. 35(a)(4), Pizzuto's claim fails because 
he has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The proper standard of review is discussed in section III(B) above. 
C. Standads Of Law Regarding The Withholding Of Exculpatorv Evidence And The 
Correction Of False Testimony By The Prosecutor 
Under m, 373 U.S. at 87, and its progeny, the prosecution has a duty to 
disclose evidence that is both favorable to the defense and material to either guilt or 
punishment. The suppression of such evidence violates due process. Id. at 86-87. To 
prove a Bradv violation, Pizzuto must show three components: "The evidence at issue 
must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281- 
82 (1999). The Court discussed the issue of prejudice or materiality in K ~ l e s  v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419,434 (1995): 
Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a 
different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not 
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received 
a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is accordingly 
shown when the government's evidentiafy suppression "undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial." [Citation omitted]. 
In w, 514 U.S. at 434-36, the Court reiterated, once a reviewing court has 
found a constitutional violation applying the materiality test from United States v. 
m, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), there is no need for further harmless error analysis. 
The Court also explained that in assessing materiality, the withheld evidence is viewed 
collectively, "not item-by-item." Id. at 436-38. 
In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the Supreme Court explained the state 
cannot obtain a conviction through the use of evidence known to the state to be false. 
"The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it 
to go uncorrected when it appears." at 269. Materiality is based upon "'the well- 
established rule that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is 
fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the 
false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury."' L a k ,  134 Idaho at 649 
(emphasis in original) (quoting E&&y, 473 U.S. at 678). "This standard is a 'strict 
standard of materiality not just because [these cases] involve prosecutorial misconduct, 
but more importantly because they involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of 
the trial process."' Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 538, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986) (quoting 
w u r s ,  427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 
D. Pizzuto Has Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding 
"Prosecutorial Misconduct" 
While evidence of an alleged "deal" with Rice could be used as impeachment 
evidence, based upon the evidence presented to the jury, it is nothing more than 
cumulative impeachment evidence and therefore fails. Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735,740- 
41 (9th Cir. 2006); Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Marashi, 913 F.2d 724,732 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Moreover, Pizzuto has failed to establish either, that the alleged deal was 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, or any reasonable likelihood that 
Rice's allegedly false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. The jury 
was repeatedly told Rice was given a deal whereby he pled guilty to the lesser offense of 
second-degree murder. (#16489, Tr., pp.1775-76, 1880-85.) Rice was also questioned 
regarding his drug use with Odom and their relationship. (#16489, Tr., pp.1778-83.) 
Rice was required to answer questions regarding his extensive prior criminal history 
including robbery, receiving stolen property and burglary. (#16489, Tr., pp.1794-99.) 
Throughout his testimony, Rice was impeached with prior inconsistent statements and 
acknowledged he had not told the truth. (#16489, Tr., pp. 1766-74, 18 13-17, 1874-75.) 
Pizzuto's claim is even more benign than the claim in u, 134 Idaho at 646- 
649, where the petitioner contended the state had allegedly withheld an agreement with a 
jailhouse informant who testified at the petitioner's trial. The supreme court concluded 
the evidence was "cumulative with evidence already within the possession of the defense 
at the time when Sivak filed his first petition for post-conviction relief." Id. at 648-49. 
Clearly, even if a deal existed with Rice that was not disclosed, it was nothing 
more than cumulative impeachment evidence, and there is no reasonable likelihood it 
could have affected the judgment of the jury. Therefore, Pizzuto's failure to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact required the dismissal of this claim. 
Because Pizzuto Failed To Establish A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Re~arding His 
"Actual Innocence" Claim, It Fails On The Merits 
The exact basis of Pimto's  argument on appeal is somewhat of a mystery. The 
state is unable to determine whether Pizzuto is contending actual innocence permits him 
to circumvent I.C. 19-2719 or he is raising a free-standing actual innocence claim. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.44-45.) Irrespective, assuming Pizzuto overcomes the procedural 
bars associated with I.C. 3 19-2719 and this Court "relaxes" the requirements of I.A.R. 
35(a)(4), Pizzuto's claim fails. 
While there is no question that a claim of actual innocence provides a gateway for 
federal habeas petitions to overcome procedural default, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 
538-39 (2006), I.C. 5 19-2719 does not provide the same gateway. Rather, as explained 
above, the only exception permitting the filing of a successive post-conviction petition in 
a capital case is "where the petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not 
known or could not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time frame." 
McKinnep, 133 Idaho at 700-01. 
To the extent Pizzuto is raising a free-standing actual innocence claim and such a 
claim is cogni~able in post-conviction proceedings, it must be rejected. Piimto's claim 
of actual innocence is basically premised upon his contention regarding the alleged deal 
with Rice, which is nothing more than cumulative impeachment evidence, a claim 
regarding Odom that has already been rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court, and an 
allegation regarding false blood evidence that was presented and rejected by the jury. 
(#34845, R., p.403.) Even if I.C. 3 19-2719 permitted the filing of a successive post- 
conviction petition based upon "actual innocence," the claim is not supported by genuine 
issues of material facts. In light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, even if the 
three allegations are true, they do not establish Pizzuto's actual innocence. 
Because Pizzuto Failed To Establish A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding His 
"Cumulative Error" Claim, It Also Fails On The Merits 
Finally, Pizzuto contends, "The cumulative effect of the constitutional errors in 
this case denied Mr. Pizzuto a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, p.58.) Assuming Pizzuto 
overcomes the procedural bars associated with I.C. § 19-2719 and this Court "relaxes" 
the requirements of I.A.R. 35(a)(4), Pizzuto's claim fails because he has failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. 
Before this Court can find cumulative error, it must first find error. "When there 
is an 'accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when 
aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial,' the cumulative error doctrine 
requires a reversal of the conviction as the trial has contravened the defendant's right to 
due process." State v. Pavne, 145 Idaho 548, ---, 199 P.3d 123, 143 (2008) (quoting State 
v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174 (1998)). Because Pizzuto has failed to 
demonstrate error, let alone an aggregate of harmless errors, this Court cannot reverse 
based on the cumulative error doctrine. 
Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish Judge Owen Abused His Discretion When He 
Reconsidered Judge Williamson's Decision And Dismissed Pizzuto's Remaining Claim 
A. Introduction 
Pizzuto contends Judge Owen abused his discretion by granting the state's Motion 
to Reconsider and dismissing Pizzuto's remaining claim because the state allegedly 
offered no new evidence to support its motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.33-35.) Because 
the party requesting reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not required to present 
new evidence, Pizzuto's argument is without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court." Cam~bell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 254, 258, 159 P.3d 
891 (2007). 
C. Legal Framework For Reconsideration Of An Interlocutory Order 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure pennit the filing of "[a] motion for 
reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court . . . at any time before the 
entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final 
judgment." I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). "I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) provides a district court with 
authority to reconsider and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not 
been entered." Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 785, 69 P.3d 1035 
(2003). A successor judge is permitted, under I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), to reconsider the 
rulings of a prior judge. Farmers National Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 
762 (1994). "Generally, post-conviction applications arc governed by the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure." Dunlar, v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d 376 (2004) 
D. J u d ~ e  Owen Did Not Abuse His Discretion 
Pizzuto's contention that the party requesting reconsideration of an interlocutory 
order must present new evidence is without merit. In Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 
468, 472, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis in original), after reviewing several 
prior cases, the court of appeals concluded: 
Although there is language in some appellate opinions that could 
be construed to support Larnbros's argument, we disagree with his 
characterization of the requirements for such a motion. In our view, the 
case law applying Rule ll(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new 
evidence when a motion is brought under that rule, but does not require 
that the motion be accompanied by new evidence. 
Because the state was not required to present new evidence or argument, Pizzuto 
has failed to establish Judge Owen abused his discretion.13 
Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Reauest For Depositions 
A. Introduction 
Contending he was entitled to "obtain and thoroughly review all records and files 
pertaining to the defendant" and that his search for exculpatory evidence overrides the 
prohibitions associated with I.C.R. 57(b), Pizzuto contends the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his request to depose the following: (1) Judge Reinhardt; (2) 
former Idaho County Prosecutor Henry Boomer; (3) former Idaho County Sheriff Randy 
Baldwin; (4) Odom's former attorney, Greg FitzMaurice; (5) Rice's former attorney, 
Wayne MacGregor; (6) former Idaho County Prosecutor Jeff Payne; and (7), Pizzuto's 
former co-counsel, Scott Wayman. (Appellant's brief, pp.35-40.) 
Assuming Pizzuto overcomes the procedural bars associated with I.C. § 19-2719 
and this Court "relaxes" the requirements of I.A.R. 35(a)(4), because the pivotal issue 
was whether he knew or should have known of the successive post-conviction claims, he 
" Moreover, even if the state were required to present new evidence, the information 
regarding Judge Williamson's recusal based upon Judge Reinhardt having presided over 
a lawsuit in which she was a party was certainly sufficient "new evidence" to warrant 
reconsideration. 
has failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion by refusing to order all 
the requested depositions, particularly where the court authorized the use of four 
interrogatories and the depositions of Boomer and Baldwin. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Discovery in post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter left to the discretion of 
the district court and will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. 
Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 31 1, 319,912 P.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
deny in^ His Reauest For De~ositions 
On May 8, 2006, Pizzuto filed a Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery 
requesting that he be permitted to depose the individuals listed above, except for 
Baldwin. (#34845, R., pp.376-81.) Relying upon I.C.R. 57(b), the district court denied 
Pizzuto's motion for depositions, but permitted him to submit "no more than four 
interrogatory questions each to Hank Boomer and Randy Baldwin, vvho Rawson alleges 
to have been present at dinner when the alleged statement was made." (#34845, R., 
pp.20-21.) Pizzuto responded to the court's order by filing a Notice of Intent not to 
Submit Interrogatories and Renewed Request for Depositions, not only declining the 
court's offer to submit the four interrogatories, but also requesting for the first time to 
depose Baldwin. (#34845, R., pp.529-32.) Addressing Pizzuto's motion, the court 
concluded it would permit the depositions of Boomer and Baldwin, limited to the alleged 
dinner conversation. (#34845, R., pp.538-39.) Although a subpoena was issued for 
Boomer's deposition (#34845, R., pp.546A-B), the record does not establish either 
deposition was completed. 
While post-conviction cases are civil in nature, State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548 (1983), the rules of discovery contained in Idaho's rules of civil 
procedure do not apply in post-conviction cases. I.C.R. 57(b). "When an applicant 
believes discovery is necessary for acquisition of evidence to support a claim for post- 
conviction relief, the applicant must obtain authorization from the court to conduct 
discovery." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). 
"Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the district 
court is not required to order discovery." Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 
P.3d 924 (2001). In Raudebaugh, the petitioner made conclusory statements about what 
an expert and investigator might have testified to at trial but did not point to specific 
facts. && The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of discovery 
because "Raudebaugh's allegations only argue what the experts might have testified to 
had trial counsel employed them. Raudebaugh's allegations are speculative." Id. 
In Aeschilman v. State, 132 ldaho 397, 754, 973 P.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1999), the 
court of appeals denied post-conviction discovery because the applicant failed to 
"identify the type of information that he or she may obtain through discovery that could 
affect the disposition of his or her application for post-conviction relief." See also 
LePage v. State, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.32d 1064 (Ct. App. 2003) ("In order to be 
granted discovery, a post-conviction applicant must identify the specific subject matter 
where discovery is requested and why discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or 
her application"). 
Based upon the procedural posture of Pizzuto's case at the time he requested 
discovery, he was not entitled to, nor should the district court have permitted him to 
depose the individuals requested in his motion. The issue before the court was whether 
Pizzuto could overcome the procedural bars imposed by I.C. $ 19-2719. Pizzuto was first 
required to establish the claims in his successive petition were not known or reasonably 
could not have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition, his claims 
were not facially insufficient because they alleged matters that were merely cumulative or 
impeaching, and that they were timely. Because the district court concluded he failed to 
meet those preliminary burdens, P i m t o  has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
Pizzuto's reliance upon & and its progeny is also misplaced. First, & 
requires the disclosure of only exculpatory evidence. Pizzuto has not made any showing 
the state withheld exculpatory evidence other than allege the state withheld information 
regarding Rice's alleged plea agreement. Rather, his &g& argument is a precursor to 
embarking on a fishing expedition. As explained in United States v. Piers, 2005 WL 
2122126, *2 (D. Alaska 2005) (quoting United States v. Baeley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, n.7 
(quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967))), "Brady does not create a discovery 
rule. 'An interpretation of Brady to create a broad, constitutionally required right of 
discovery 'would entirely alter the character and balance of our present system of 
criminal justice."" 
Relying upon the steady beat of "death is different," Pizzuto also contends he 
should have been granted discovery based upon "heightened procedural safeguards" in 
capital cases. While the courts have applied such safeguards in limited situations, 
Pizzuto has provided no authority applying those safeguards to discovery issues in 
collateral or post-conviction cases. In Fields, 135 Idaho at 292, the Idaho Supreme Court 
expressly applied I.C.R. 57 to a capital case, explaining: 
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter put 
to the sound discretion of the district court. I.C.R. 57(b). The discovery 
provisions in the civil rules, which generally apply to proceedings on an 
application for post-conviction relief, are not applicable unless so ordered 
by the district court. Grfjth v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 825 P.2d 94 (Ct. 
App. 1992). There is no requirement that the district court order 
discovery, unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's 
substantial rights. Id. 
Moreover, in State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 108, 967 P.2d 702 (1998), the 
supreme court discussed when a post-conviction petitioner may take the deposition of the 
trial judge, "The question then is whether there were facts not in the record that were 
relevant to the post-conviction review proceedings and were not otherwise available to 
Wood." Because the information Pizzuto sought from Judge Reinhardt was available 
from other sources, specifically, Boomer, Baldwin and Rawson, the district court 
properly denied the request to depose Judge Reinhardt. 
Rather than requesting discovery that was necessary to protect his substantial 
rights, Pizzuto's request constituted a "fishing expedition,' which is not permitted 
because post-conviction cases are "not a vehicle for unrestrained testimony or retesting of 
physical evidence introduced at the criminal trial." Mumhy, 143 Idaho at 148, 
Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Motion To File Additional Affidavits Because Thev Were Inadmissible 
A. Introduction 
Pizzuto contends the district court abused its discretion by striking documents 2 6  
through 2-15 and the Affidavit of Ronald D. Howen because they "were relevant and 
admissible for the consideration of the claims made." (Appellant's brief, pp.40-44.) 
First, Pizmto is incorrect that all of the documents were "stricken" from the 
record. The district court's order clearly delineates that only documents 2-6 through 2-8, 
Z-10, 2-12, 2-15, and the Affidavit of Ronald D. Howen were "stricken." (#34845, R., 
p.518.) Second, assuming Pizzuto overcomes the procedural bars associated with I.C. 3 
19-2719 and this Court "relaxes" the requirements of I.A.R. 35(a)(4), because the 
documents did not contain relevant information regarding whether he could overcome the 
procedural hurdles of I.C. 5 19-2719 and violate Idaho rules of evidence, he has failed to 
establish the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its judgment 
will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion. State v. Howard, 
135 Idaho 727,731-32,24 P.3d 44 (2001); State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971,974,829 
P.2d 861 (1 992). 
C. Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion Bv 
Denvine His Reauest To File Certain Affidavits And Declarations 
On May 8, 2006, Pizzuto filed a Motion for Leave to File Additional Affidavits 
(#34845, R., pp.374-75), which included appendices 2-6 through Z-15 (#34845, R., 
p.672, referencing exhibit 10). Howen's affidavit, attached to a Notice of Lodging, was 
not filed until May 23,2006. (#34845, R., pp.482-84.) Addressing Pizzuto's motion, the 
district court concluded his motion would not be granted with respect to documents 2-8 
through Z-10, 2-12, 2-1 5 and the Affidavit of Ronald D. Howen because they did not 
contain admissible evidence, but were either irrelevant andlor contained inadmissible 
hearsay. (#34845, R., pp.516-18.) 
There is no question a post-conviction petition must be verified with respect to 
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, records or other 
evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or the petition must state why such 
supporting evidence is not included with the petition. Haves v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 137 
P.3d 475, 91 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing I.C. $ 19-4903). "In other words, the petition must 
present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or it will be 
subject to dismissal." Id. (emphasis added.) 
The district court properly exercised its discretion by not admitting the documents 
because they contained information that was not admissible under the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. For example, Appendix 2-7 discusses an interview by Brenda Bentley of Ron 
Howen, which is nothing but statements Howen allegedly made to Bentley. (#34845, R., 
p.672, exhibit 10, Appendix 2-7.) The contents of the affidavit clearly contain 
inadmissible hearsay in violation of I.R.E. 802. The same is true with Appendix 2-8, 
which contains nothing but statements Karen Talbot Kloer allegedly made to Bentley. 
(#34845, p.372, exhibit 10, Appendix 2-8.) 
The affidavits contained in appendices 2-6, 2-10, 2-12, and 2-15 (#34845, R., 
p.372, exhibit lo), and the Affidavit of Ronald D. Howen (#34845, R., pp.484-$7) were 
not admitted because they are irrelevant (#34845, R., p.5 18). Not only are they irrelevant 
to the issue before the court - whether Pizzuto's claims could withstand the procedural 
hurdles of I.C. § 19-2719 - they also contain irrelevant information regarding the merits 
of the claims under LR.E. 404(b) because they contain inadmissible evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts "to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity 
therewith." State v. Grist, --- Idaho ---, 2009 WL 198963, *2 (2009). 
Because the issue before the district court was not "the claims made," but whether 
the claims could withstand the procedural hurdles of I.C. 5 19-2719, and because 
consideration of the documents violated the Idaho Rules of Evidence, Pizzuto has failed 
to establish the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the documents. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that Pizzuto's appeal be dismissed or, alternatively, 
that the decisions of the district court be affirmed on appeal. 
DATED this 3oth day of March, 2009. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 30Ih day of March, 2009, I caused to 
be serviced a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following: 
Joan M. Fisher X U.S. Mail 
Federal Defenders for the 
- Hand Delivery 
Eastern District of California Overnight Mail 
801 I Street, 3'd Floor Facsimile 
Sacramento, CA 958 14 Electronic Court Filing 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 1 $ .:*
1 .!/ .:, 
1 ORDER GRANTING MOTION I!; Plaintiff-Respondent, $:, ,‘. .. 
1 TO DISMISS APPEAL . t t  /!i 1 ,  
1 2:: v. 
1 Nos. 32677132678 :1: ::! 
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR., 1 Ref. No. 06s-043 :!I 1; 
1 , :; ... .?, ,* 
Defendant-Appellant. ) j l j  /Ti  t(i 
A MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL was filed by Respondent October 10, 2006. A BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL was filed by Appellant 
November 27, 2006. Thereafter, an AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE of Appellant's 
Brief in Opposition to State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal was filed by Appellant November 30, 
2006. A REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS with 
attachment was filed by Respondent December 1, 2006. The Court is fully advised; therefore, 
good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL be, and 
hereby is, GRANTE 
200&. 
By Order of@ Supreme/Court 
cc: Counsel of Record u 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL - Docket Nos. 3267 
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